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As this publication goes to press, the national conversation regarding the
compensation and employment terms offered to senior executives in the United
States continues to gain greater attention and momentum, especially as the
performance of many of the country’s largest business organizations falters while
handsome compensation is paid to executives irrespective of their results.2 Some of
these large pay packages are negotiated in connection with merger and acquisitions.3
The public hue and cry has been loud, and public and private responses continue to
be suggested and implemented. Recently, some chief executives seem to be
concerned enough about perceptions of their diligence and hard work that they are
resigning from well-paid positions on other corporate boards.4
While the Tennessee Model Employment Agreement is not expressly
designed for chief executives of large companies that have reporting requirements to
governmental regulatory authorities, the terms of a senior executive’s employment
are no less important to a company backed by private equity investors, to a closely
held or family-owned company with a small (but curious) base of equity holders, or
even to the local banker who provides the debt financing for the company’s
operations.5 Indeed, there seem to be more and stronger suggestions that a
company’s approach to executive compensation bears a relationship not only to the
interests of the company’s equity holders but also to the national best interest.6
In this context, the authors offer a model agreement that is intended to
provide a reasonable middle ground. The authors intend that the Tennessee Model
Employment Agreement be useful in the planning and execution of the acquisition
transaction and that it benefit counsel for the buyer, who is interested in retaining the
acquisition target’s best executive talent, and counsel for the prospective executive
2

See Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at BU1.

See Randall S. Thomas, Explaining The International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture Or Market Driven?, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1244-45 (2004) (describing the factors that lead to this phenomenon).
3

See, e.g., John Greenwald, CEOs to Boards: We’re Outta Here, CORP. BOARD MEMBER, First Quarter
2009, at 22 (reporting that many chief executive officers are stepping down from positions as outside
directors for other corporations).
4

See Ronald Bottano & Russell Miller, Competitive Pay for Private Companies, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, June
4, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/careers/content/jun2007/ca20070604_061560.htm?campaign_id=rs
s_null.

5

6 See George M. Keller, Slow Down the Gravy Train: Some Form of Special Leadership is Called For as Those at
the Top of the Pyramid Continue to Pull Away from the Rest of the American People, DIRECTORS AND BOARDS,
Jan. 1, 2009, at 64; see also Jonathan Weisman & Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays Out Limits on Executive
Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at A1.
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employee. As a reference transaction for the Tennessee Model Employment
Agreement, the authors have chosen to use the asset acquisition contemplated by the
Annotated Model Tennessee Asset Purchase Agreement (an agreement in the
previously referenced series of annotated model agreements for acquisition
transactions in Tennessee) drafted and annotated by Angela Humphreys Hamilton
and Joan MacLeod Heminway (the “Asset Purchase Agreement”).7 Accordingly, the
employer is assumed to be the buyer of a privately held Tennessee corporation, and
Tennessee law applies to both the Asset Purchase Agreement and the ensuing
employment relationship. As applicable, the Tennessee Model Employment
Agreement reflects the authors’ stylistic preferences and has been drafted and
annotated with an emphasis on Tennessee law and practice, although sources of
general application (as well as those reflecting Tennessee law and practice) are cited
in support of drafting choices, ideas, and perspectives. There is no clear lineage for
the Tennessee Model Employment Agreement;, the authors acknowledge that it is
the product of the analysis, thoughts, and experiences of many practitioners.
Typically, if a business owner who is selling his or her company is interested
in remaining with the new owner after the sale, the owner-seller will insist on
negotiating and agreeing to, at least, the principal terms of employment at the
inception of the transaction.8 These principal employment terms would usually be
included in a term sheet or letter of intent.9 Sometimes, the formal employment
agreement is entered into before the merger or acquisition agreement; other times,

Hamilton & Heminway, supra note 1. If the authors had chosen to use a merger or stock sale (rather
than an asset sale) as the predicate acquisition transaction, then certain issues additional to or distinct
from those highlighted here would need to be explored. For example, if the predicate acquisition
were being completed by way of a federally regulated tender offer, then the authors would need to
address the potential inclusion of the value of the relevant employment agreement or agreements in
the tender offer consideration, in compliance with the “best price” provision in Rule 14d-10 under the
Securities Act of 1934, as amended. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a) (2009); In re Digital Island Sec. Litig.,
223 F. Supp. 2d 546, 556-59 (D. Del. 2002).
7

Sometimes, the executive is not the owner of the business or is one of a number of owners. With
modifications, the Tennessee Model Employment Agreement also can be used to employ an executive
post-acquisition in these other circumstances.
8

See Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract
Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 403 (1999) (“In complex negotiations over the sale of a business, the
extension of commercial loans, or executive employment contracts, it is not uncommon for the
parties to reach an agreement on the major terms such as price and financing in a ‘letter of intent’ or
‘agreement-in-principle.’”).
9
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the execution and delivery of the formal contract is a condition to the closing of the
merger or acquisition.10
While some selling executives may want to move on to other adventures
after selling their company, others believe that, with the right buyer in the position as
new owner, the selling executive is the best person to manage the company’s
vendors, customers, and personnel, at least through the post-acquisition
integration.11 This may be especially important if some type of “earn-out” is a
component of the purchase price for the company, in which the post-acquisition
financial performance of the company dictates the amount of the “earn-out”
payment made to the seller.12 Or it may be equally important, for example, if the
buyer is significantly larger than the target company and, in the perception of the
selling executive, a strong, steady, familiar hand is required to smoothly guide the
existing personnel into the new and different business culture of the buyer’s

10 One seasoned corporate counsel writes (in reviewing a model stock purchase agreement produced
by the American Bar Association):

[T]he Model provides, as a condition to closing, for the execution of employment
agreements with key executives. In certain transactions, however, particularly those
involving public companies (where it is important to the buyer that key employees
be retained or at least execute noncompetition agreements), it is advisable that
agreements be reached with key employees prior to the execution of a purchase
agreement. Otherwise, there is the risk of enhancing the bargaining strength of
such employees who will realize that they hold the key to satisfaction of certain
essential closing conditions.
Kenneth J. Bialkin, Model Stock Purchase Agreement With Commentary: Manual On Acquisition Review, 52
BUS. LAW. 733, 738 n.22 (1997) (book review) (citation omitted). For an example of a closing
condition providing for the execution of an executive employment agreement, see Heminway &
Prester, supra note 1, at 303 (Section 6.01(e)).
11 Acquirors of the business often agree. See Ben Walther, Note, Employment Agreements and Tender
Offers: Reforming the Problematic Treatment of Severance Plans under Rule 14d-10, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 774,
805 (2002) (“[E]mployment arrangements are often vital to an acquirer’s plan to realize value from an
acquired firm, because the employment agreements may be necessary to retain the services of target
executives with highly valuable experience. . . . [S]ynergistic gains may be impossible to realize if the
target management leaves the firm, thereby walking off with much of the accumulated expertise and
knowledge of the organization.”).

See Scott Henderson, Earnout Provisions Can Help Set Acquisition Price, CHARLOTTE BUS. J., Feb. 1,
2008, available at http://charlotte.bizjournals.com/charlotte/stories/2008/02/04/focus5.html; see also,
e.g., Anne Field, How to Survive an Earnout, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, June 20, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_25/b3938451.htm.

12
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organization.13 Moreover, the buyer may recognize that the executive is needed for
this or other purposes. In fact, the retention of target company executives in a
merger or acquisition may be an essential component of the transaction.14
The Tennessee Model Employment Agreement anticipates that the executive
would be employed by the buyer for a fixed duration that renews indefinitely unless
either party provides the required notice prior to the commencement of the initial or
any renewal term. In addition, post-termination restrictive covenants relating to
competition and disclosure of confidential information are included in the Tennessee
Model Employment Agreement, notwithstanding that the executive, if also a party to
the acquisition agreement itself, may be subject to additional restrictive covenants
supported by the purchase price consideration that buyer paid in connection with the
acquisition.15 The Tennessee Model Employment Agreement does not contemplate
that the executive will be producing, in any serious quantity, patentable intellectual
property while employed, although a more general provision relating to inventions
and discoveries is included for reference purposes. None of the provisions in the
Tennessee Model Employment Agreement are intended to suggest that the executive
selling a company is precluded from negotiating terms that are more advantageous or
See, e.g., Brooks Barnes, Disney and Pixar: The Power of the Prenup, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at BU1
(discussing Disney’s acquisition of Pixar and the agreements in place to protect Pixar’s culture and
employees during the assimilation).

13

14 Walther, supra note 11, at 774-75 (“[T]oday’s quintessential merger is motivated by strategic
considerations or expectations of value-creating synergies, and depends for its success on the
continued employment of target personnel. As a result, satisfactory resolution of post-merger
employment issues (such as the compensation and retention of target executives) can often be the
difference between a successful acquisition and a failed merger discussion.”).

The acquisition agreement may, for example, include post-closing nondisclosure, noncompetition,
and nonsolicitation covenants. Any covenants of the same kind in the employment agreement
typically would supplement these acquisition agreement covenants and operate over a specified postemployment time period. It is important to review applicable state law in connection with these
provisions. Legal standards governing the validity of these types of restrictive covenants vary from
state to state, and the context of the covenants—i.e., whether they are incidental to employment or a
business combination—may impact their enforceability. See Palmer & Cay, Inc. v. Marsh &
McLennan Cos., 404 F.3d 1297, 1303-06 (11th Cir. 2005) (describing the enforceability of
noncompetition covenants under Georgia law); Don Benson & Stephanie Bauer Daniel, New Race to
Tennessee and Georgia Courthouses Over Non-competition Agreements, 41 TENN. B.J. 18 (2005) (describing the
analysis in Palmer & Cay and warning Tennessee employers with Georgia employees about the need to
win the race to the courthouse if they desire to enforce noncompetition agreements after Palmer &
Cay). Moreover, specialized state legislation also may impact the validity or enforceability of, in
particular, noncompetition and nonsolicitation provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 202-k
(McKinney 2008) (known as the Broadcast Employees Freedom to Work Act, this law prohibits
certain noncompetition agreements that restrict the employment of broadcast employees).
15
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that the buyer is required to offer the full complement of compensation and fringe
benefits that are included and described. The intent is to provide a basic framework
for negotiations so that the buyer and the executive can work together toward
completing a mutually beneficial acquisition transaction and, one hopes, an ongoing
business organization characterized by continued growth and success.
We would be remiss if we did not take a moment to comment on the
professional responsibility and ethics issues that arise in the negotiation, drafting, and
execution of employment agreements, especially in a merger or acquisition context.
For example, executives are often not represented by separate counsel when entering
into an employment agreement with the firm. In fact, the executive may have a
close, pre-existing professional relationship with the firm’s counsel, from whom the
executive may routinely seek advice in conducting the firm’s business. In these
circumstances, the firm’s lawyer must be scrupulously careful to observe applicable
professional responsibility rules relating to the identity of his or her client and the
nature of the professional relationship,16 and must refrain from offering legal advice
to the executive.17 As one practitioner-author notes:

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007) (regarding the organization as a client). Of
special significance are the following parts of the rule:
16

(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents.
....
(f) In dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s interests
are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
Id.; see also id. cmts 10 & 11.
17

Id. R. 4.3 (regarding dealings with an unrepresented person). The Rule provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands
the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct
the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented
person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility
of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

Id.; see also id. cmts 1 & 2.
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In representing his client, a lawyer may not give an unrepresented
individual any advice other than advice to seek counsel. The attorney
is allowed to discuss the subject matter of the dispute, but may not
imply that he is a disinterested person; at all times the lawyer must
clarify the exact nature of his role and interest in the dispute. As long
as there is no overreaching or misrepresentation, the attorney may
draft documents and submit them to the unrepresented party for
signature. Although an attorney should not suggest specific counsel,
he or she may suggest legal aid or other bar referral services approved
by the bar. An attorney may not circumvent this rule by using the
client or some third party as a medium to give advice to the
unrepresented party.18
Of course, globalism also impacts professional responsibility and ethics.19
U.S. firms are acquired by foreign firms and foreign firms are acquired by U.S. firms;
employment agreements may be cross-border contracts. These cross-border
transactions raise issues regarding, for example, the unauthorized practice of law
(which is, of course, also an issue in multijurisdictional transactions within the United
States).20 In this connection, it is important to note that legal services outsourcing
has become more commonplace.21 Corporations should give serious consideration to
the appropriateness of outsourcing the drafting of individual agreements. Most
would agree that an acquisition-related employment agreement is not a good
candidate for outsourcing.22

Dennis P. Duffy, Selected Ethics and Professionalism Issues in Labor and Employment Law Cases, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, ADV. EMP. L. & LITIG. 943, 1047-48 (Dec. 2005) (footnotes
omitted).
18

See generally Jamie Y. Whitaker, Note, Remedying Ethical Conflicts in a Global Legal Market, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1079 (2006) (illustrating professional responsibility issues in a global context).
19

See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Uni-State Lawyers and Multinational Practice: Dealing with International,
Transnational, and Foreign Law, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1135, 1142-54 (2001) (describing issues
relating to the unauthorized practice of law in multijurisdictional matters); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2007) (regarding unauthorized and multijurisdictional law practice).
20

21 See generally James I. Ham, Ethical Considerations Relating to Outsourcing of Legal Services by Law Firms to
Foreign Service Providers: Perspectives from the United States, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 323, 342-43 (2008)
(regarding professional responsibility implications of legal outsourcing); Keith Woffinden, Comment,
Surfing the Next Wave of Outsourcing: The Ethics of Sending Domestic Legal Work to Foreign Countries Under
New York City Opinion 2006-3, 2007 BYU L. REV. 483 (2007) (same).

Ham, supra note 21, at 343 (“Highly fact-intensive matters that would require the overseas staff to
become familiar with every minute detail of a matter may not be suitable for outsourcing. Examples
might include merger and acquisition documentation, employment agreements for executives, and
22
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Like the other installments in this series, this model agreement has been
drafted using certain “plain English” drafting conventions.23 Archaic language,
including the words “hereof,” “thereof,” “whereof,” “hereunder,” “thereunder,”
“hereby,” “thereby,” “wheretofore,” and “whereas,” has been avoided throughout.24
Additionally, “under” is used instead of “pursuant to,”25 and “such” is used as an
adjective or as a demonstrative (referential) pronoun as infrequently as possible and
only where the intended reference is clear.26 Finally, where words are listed in series,
the discretionary comma before the conjunction has been included.27 These stylistic
preferences have been employed to create a consistent, clearer, more readable form.

joint venture agreements; fact-intensive pleadings where the United States lawyer has interviewed the
client and is most familiar with the underlying facts; and matters requiring active negotiation.”).
See, e.g., THOMAS R. HAGGARD & GEORGE W. KUNEY, LEGAL DRAFTING IN A NUTSHELL 6 (2007)
(citing eight “Characteristics of Plain English”).
23

See, e.g., HOWARD DARMSTADTER, HEREOF, THEREOF, AND EVERYWHEREOF: A CONTRARIAN
GUIDE TO LEGAL DRAFTING 5-6 (2002) (noting that for words of this kind, “their distance from
common speech makes them prime candidates for the chop, and they are usually dispensed with”);
BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH: A TEXT WITH EXERCISES 35 (2001)
(classifying some of these words as “commonplace legalisms that skulk in every paragraph of listless
legal writing”). See generally HAGGARD & KUNEY, supra note 23, at 6, 309 (noting that the “absence of
overly legal jargon” is a characteristic of plain English and that words like these are archaic and
constitute legalese).
24

See KENNETH A. ADAMS, A MANUAL OF STYLE FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING 369 (2d ed. 2008)
(classifying “pursuant to” as a “lawyerism” that can be replaced with “under, in accordance with, [and]
as authorized by”); GARNER, supra note 24, at 35 (classifying “pursuant to” as a legalism that can be
replaced with “under, by, in accordance with”).
25

See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 298 (noting that using such instead of the “pointing words” the, this, that,
these, and those. . . “goes against the principle that in drafting you shouldn’t use one word to convey
different meanings . . . and it also alienates non-lawyers.”); DARMSTADTER, supra note 24, at 3
(“Lawyers tend to use any instead of a and such instead of the . . . .”); GARNER, supra note 24, at 35
(classifying “such” as a legalism that can be replaced with “that, this, those, [and] the”); HAGGARD &
KUNEY, supra note 23, at 273, 309-10 (stating that “[i]n addition to being in bad style, using ‘such’ as a
demonstrative pronoun often creates ambiguity” and directing that the drafter “[n]ever use ‘such’ as
an adjective before a singular noun” and “[n]ever use ‘same’ or ‘such’ as a pronoun”).
26

Although the more common—perhaps even the majority—rule in contract drafting is to omit the
comma, the omission of the comma may create ambiguities. See HAGGARD & KUNEY, supra note 23,
at 288-89. The most widely accepted grammatical and plain English rule is that the comma should be
included. See GARNER, supra note 24, at 148 (“Use a comma to separate items in a series—including
the last and next-to-last.”).
27

2009]

MODEL TENNESSEE EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

149

EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This Executive Employment Agreement (this “Agreement”), dated
__________, 2009,28 is by and between _______________, a Tennessee corporation
(the “Employer”), and ________________, an individual residing in the State of
Tennessee (“Executive”).
RECITALS
The Employer engages in the business of _________________ (the “Employer
Business”).29
The Employer is acquiring all the assets of [insert name of target corporation] (the
“Seller”) under the terms of an Asset Purchase Agreement among Seller, Employer,
and Employee (the “Asset Purchase Agreement”).
Executive has been employed by Seller as its Chief Executive Officer.
The Employer wishes to offer employment to Executive, and Executive wishes to
accept employment on the terms and conditions stated in this Agreement.
AGREEMENT
In consideration of the above recitals and the mutual terms and conditions
set out in this Agreement, the parties agree as set forth below.
1.
Employment and Term. The Employer employs Executive as its
Chief Operating Officer30 to perform the services and duties that the Board of
The date of the Agreement typically will be the closing date of the related acquisition, unless the
parties enter into the Agreement before the closing in anticipation of the acquisition. See supra note 10
and accompanying text.
28

29 A general description of the employer’s business is necessary to put the agreement in context. To
best guard the Employer’s interests in protecting its business through, in particular, the restrictive
covenants in the Agreement, this definition should be as detailed as possible and should reflect time
periods referenced in the Agreement (e.g., Section 8[a] of the Agreement, referencing “the Employer
Business at any time during the two-year period preceding the termination or expiration of
Executive’s employment by the Employer.”).

We have chosen to draft the Model Tennessee Employment Agreement as an employment
agreement between the acquiror and the Chief Executive Officer of the Seller. With modifications,
however, the Model Tennessee Employment Agreement can be used for the employment of other
target executive officers. For example, the reference to the Board of Directors later in the same
30
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Directors of the Employer may from time to time designate during the term of this
Agreement, and Executive accepts employment by the Employer on that basis, all
subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Executive’s employment
under the terms of this Agreement shall commence on the date of this Agreement31
and shall continue for a term of _____ years (the “Term”).32 Executive’s
employment under this Agreement shall be extended automatically for successive,
additional ____-year terms after the initial term, unless either party gives written
notice to the contrary to the other at least 90 days prior to commencement of any
renewal term.33
2.
Termination.
The Employer may terminate Executive’s
employment under this Agreement at any time during the Term [a] for Cause (as
defined in Section 8[b]) or [b] in the event of Executive’s Complete Disability (as
defined in Section 8[d]). In addition, Executive may terminate his employment with
the Employer for Good Reason (as defined in Section 8[i]. Executive’s employment
under this Agreement shall terminate automatically upon the death of Executive.
Upon termination of Executive’s employment in accordance with this Section 2,
Executive shall not be entitled to receive any further compensation or benefits from
the Employer, except as provided in Section 4[c] and except in the case of the death
of Executive, in which event the Employer shall continue to pay to Executive’s
estate or personal representative his34 Base Salary for a period of ____.35

sentence as this footnote may be changed to a reference to the President of the corporation for lowerlevel executives.
31 If the parties enter into the Agreement in advance of the closing date of the related acquisition, then
the Agreement would not become effective until the closing date of the related acquisition (and the
“start date” set forth here then would reflect that fact and, perhaps, indicate that the Agreement will
be of no further force and effect if the acquisition is never consummated). See supra note 28.

Typically, the term of an executive employment agreement is no more than five years. See Stewart J.
Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top
Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 235 (2006) (noting, in a study of public-company
executive contracts, “that the most frequent length of CEO contracts is three years and the second
most common length is five years.”).
32

33 Commonly known as an “evergreen” provision, this fixed-term/automatic renewal combination
may be useful to ensure compliance with certain state laws that limit the duration of employment
contracts for certain purposes. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 4312(b) (McKinney 2000); see also
Employment Agreement and N.Y. Ins. Law § 4312, Op. N.Y. State Ins. Dept. Gen’l Counsel, Feb. 18,
2005, available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ogco2005/rg050224.htm.

Male pronouns are used throughout the Tennessee Model Employment Agreement for ease of
reference.

34
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3.
Duties. Executive, during the term of this Agreement, will devote
his full-time attention and energies to the diligent performance of his duties as an
executive of the Employer. During the term of this Agreement, Executive will not
accept employment with any other Person (as defined in Section 8[i]) or engage in
any venture for profit that the Employer considers to be in conflict with its best
interests or to be in competition with its business or that may interfere with
Executive’s performance of his duties under this Agreement. If Executive’s
employment is terminated for any reason, Executive shall resign as an officer or
director of the Employer and each of its affiliates in which he is serving as an officer
or director.
4.

Compensation.36

[a]
The Employer shall pay to Executive as compensation for the
services to be performed by him under this Agreement an annual salary of
$____________ (the “Base Salary”), payable in equal installments no more often
than twice monthly, subject to increase from time to time by the mutual agreement
of the parties to this Agreement.
[b]
As additional compensation, the Employer may pay to
Executive an annual bonus in an amount, to be determined at the discretion of the
Employer.
[c]
If Executive’s employment is terminated by the Employer
without Cause or as a result of Complete Disability or death, or if Executive resigns
for Good Reason, then during the 12-month period commencing on the date of
termination, Executive shall be entitled to receive the annual Base Salary, in each
The benefit of a fixed period of continued salary payments after death, as provided here, may be
negotiated between the parties. A more typical provision might call for the payment of accrued salary
and cash (or cash-equivalent) benefits. See Wayne N. Outten, Negotiating Employment Agreements: An
Employee’s Lawyer’s Perspective, July 11, 2000, at 10, available at
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/annual/2000/outten2.pdf (“Employment agreements
typically provide that, when the employee dies, the employer’s only obligation under the agreement is
to pay to the employee’s estate any accrued salary, and perhaps, accrued unused vacation pay. The
employee’s lawyer may try to add payment of any accrued but unpaid bonus and a prorated bonus for
the final year of employment.”).
35

Employers should pay particular attention to the drafting of compensation provisions in
employment agreements, since ambiguities in these provisions will be construed against employers.
See Hopmayer v. Aladdin Indus., LLC, No. M2003-01583-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 364
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2004); see also Jennifer Rowlett, Case Commentary, Employment Contract
Ambiguities Construed against the Employer, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 206, 206 (2005).
36
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case payable by the Employer in regular installments in accordance with the
Employer’s general payroll practices (as in effect from time to time).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, [i] Executive shall not be entitled to receive any
severance payments under this Section 4[c] unless Executive has executed and
delivered to the Employer a general release that is reasonably acceptable to Employer
and [ii] Executive shall be entitled to receive such severance payments only so long
as Executive has not breached the provisions of Section 9 of this Agreement.
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Section 4[c], Executive shall not be
entitled to receive any severance payments from and after the date of termination.
If, within 12 months after the occurrence of a Change of Control (as
defined in Section 8[c]), the Employer elects to terminate Executive’s employment
under this Agreement for any reason or Executive elects to terminate this Agreement
by resignation, the Employer shall continue to pay Executive an amount equal to the
total amount of cash compensation paid to Executive during the ____-month
period37 immediately prior to the date of termination.38 This amount shall be paid to
Executive in a lump sum within 30 days after the date of Executive’s termination.39

The period that determines the amount of severance benefits must be carefully selected in light of
significant penalties that may be imposed on corporations and executives under federal tax laws. See
26 U.S.C. § 280G (2007) (prohibiting corporate deductions for “any excess parachute payment”); id. at
§ 4999(a) (providing for the payment of an excise tax by the executive on any “excess parachute
payment”).
37

38 The severance provided for in this subsection is an executive-friendly form of a double-trigger
change-in-control provision. A double-trigger provision typically allows the executive to receive
severance only upon the change of control and an involuntary termination (without cause or for good
reason) or constructive termination; a single-trigger provision typically allows the executive to receive
severance after a change of control of the corporation (defined to include most third-party business
combination transactions). See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time For Repeal?, 21 VA.
TAX REV. 125, 146-47 (2001) (“Most change-in-control benefits will only occur if the executive is
actually terminated in connection with a change in control. These are commonly referred to as
‘double trigger’ provisions. But some change-in-control packages will provide certain benefits, usually
limited to the accelerated vesting of stock options and restricted stock, upon a change in control even
if the executive remains employed (so-called ‘single trigger’ provisions).” (footnotes omitted)).

Under Tennessee law, this payment may, under certain circumstances, be viewed as liquidated
damages rather than severance, since payment may result from the Employer’s termination of
Executive in breach of the Agreement. See Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 96-98 (Tenn. 1999).
If the payment is in the nature of liquidated damages, then recovery of the lump sum may be
“conditioned upon a showing . . . that the amount of recovery was a reasonable estimation of
damages.” Id. at 96.
39

2009]

MODEL TENNESSEE EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
5.

153

Other Benefits.

[a]
The duties to be performed by Executive under this
Agreement require the regular use of an automobile, and the parties agree that
Employer shall, in lieu of furnishing Executive with a company car or reimbursing
Executive for expenses incurred for use of his personal automobile, pay Executive a
monthly automobile allowance of $________.40 Neither the payments to Executive
nor any other terms of this Agreement are intended to or shall make the Employer
the owner, bailor, bailee, lessor, or lessee of any automobile utilized by Executive.41
[b]
The Employer will reimburse Executive for expenses
incurred in the course and scope of the Employer’s business (other than for
automobile use), upon the presentation by Executive, from time to time, of an
account of these expenditures, setting forth the amount of each expenditure and the
purpose(s) for which it was incurred, together with receipts showing payments (to
the extent that the Executive has reasonably been able to obtain and retain them).
All reimbursable expenses must comply with the policies and procedures of the
Employer42 and any applicable budget limitations.
[c]
The Employer shall provide Executive with health, life, and
disability insurance under its group insurance plan as now or later in effect. In

40 The amount of the allowance is negotiated between the parties and constitutes additional
compensation to the Executive. This perquisite recognizes that travel may be a significant part of the
Executive’s activities. However, company cars are relatively extravagant perquisites and raise issues
for corporate employers in terms of cost (lease/purchase, repairs/maintenance, insurance, etc.) and
logistics (retirement and return of the car) that are avoided by offering an allowance in lieu of a car.
The employer may want to specify (either in the employment agreement or in a referenced corporate
policy) the expenses for which the car allowance may be used (e.g., a specific make/model of car,
limited lease payment, repairs and maintenance, fuel, etc.) or, as we have done here, treat the payment
as the equivalent of additional salary. The financial benefits of either option to an employee depend
on the circumstances, but an open-ended car allowance benefit gives the employee more choice as to
the vehicle he or she will use (although many employers with company car programs do offer
employees some choice as to the make/model of the vehicle).
41 This sentence clarifies that the Employer bears no responsibility, contractual or otherwise, for the
vehicle that is the subject of the automobile allowance.
42 The Employer should ensure that policy and procedure documentation does not contain provisions
that are inconsistent with the Agreement since, as a result of the reference here and the operation of
Section 21 of the Agreement, these policies and procedures are incorporated by reference into and
become part of the Agreement.
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addition, Executive shall receive vacation and holiday benefits in accordance with the
Employer’s policies as now or later in effect.43
[d]
The Employer will pay the reasonable cost of a __________
membership44 for Executive and any related recurring periodic fees.
6.
Stock Options.45 The Employer is granting to Executive qualified
incentive stock options (as defined by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
This section effectively puts Executive in the same position as other employees of the Employer
who have implicit, rather than explicit, employment contracts. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling
the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1049 (1996) (“[T]here is almost never any ex ante communication of
the health insurance terms . . . . The terms of the health insurance agreement are unilaterally provided
by the employer in almost all cases.”). The provisions of this section do not offer certainty to
Executive in the form of a base-minimum level of benefits. As the Employer’s plans change,
Executive’s coverage changes, even if the changes reduce coverage. See id. (“[S]pontaneous, unilateral
novations in the [implicit employment] contract occur each time the employer revises the terms of the
health policy provided. . . . Indeed, an employer may, in some instances, completely eliminate health
insurance coverage from the employment relationship without any apparent ‘breach’ in the
agreement.”). An executive who is unwilling to surrender total control of his or her welfare and other
insurance benefits to the acquiror may bargain, at a minimum, for the acquiror to afford him or her
the same level of benefits provided to the executive by the target corporation before consummation
of the acquisition.
43

44 This paragraph is designed to cover any trade or professional association, country club, luncheon
club, or health club membership for which the Employer is assuming financial responsibility.
45 “Providing up-front equity compensation is generally considered desirable because it immediately
links the executive’s compensation with company performance and offers favorable long-term capital
gains treatment if the company shares are held by the executive for at least 12 months.” Jonathan M.
Ocker & Gregory C. Schick, Practice Tips: Employment Agreements for New Economy Chief Executives, 23
L.A. LAWYER 21, 22 (2000). The Employer and Executive both should understand that this section
of the Agreement interfaces with federal (and potentially state) securities laws. See, e.g., Yoder v.
Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that an agreement to
issue stock to seller/executive in connection with acquisition constitutes a sale of stock under the
federal securities laws). Options to purchase stock are securities under the federal definitions in the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended (“1933 Act”), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (“1934 Act”). 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (2007) (1933 Act definition); id. § 78c(a)(10) (1934 Act
definition). Although the Tennessee statute is not as clear, stock options also appear to be securities
under Tennessee law. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-102(16) (2008). Accordingly, issuers should be
concerned about registering the issuance of the options (or using an existing applicable registration
statement) under the 1933 Act or finding an applicable exemption and, under federal law, registering
the options as a class of securities under the 1934 Act.

The proliferation of broad-based employee incentives . . . has created a crisis for
many privately held companies under an otherwise unremarkable provision of the
federal securities laws. The Commission has taken the position that the over-thecounter registration requirements of the . . . [1934 Act] can cause a privately held
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amended)46 to purchase _________ shares of the Employer’s Common Stock,
$______ par value per share, at an exercise price of $______ per share,47 in a
separate, fully executed stock option agreement dated as of the date of this
Agreement, signed by the Employer, and delivered to Executive with this
Agreement. Under the terms of the option agreement: [a] if Executive resigns other
than for Good Reason or the Employer terminates the employment of Executive for
Cause (as defined in Section 8[b]), Complete Disability, or death, all of Executive’s
rights with respect to any unvested options shall terminate; and [b] if Executive
resigns within 12 months after the occurrence of a Change of Control or the
Employer terminates the employment of Executive at any time for any reason other
than for Cause, Complete Disability, or death, all of Executive’s rights with respect
to unvested options shall vest as of the date of termination.
7.
No Conflicting Agreement; Understanding; Right to Counsel.
Executive represents and warrants to the Employer that Executive is not a party to
or subject to the provisions of any other employment agreement, non-compete
agreement, or other agreement with any other Person, the terms of which would be
breached in any respect by his execution of this Agreement or performance of his
duties as the Chief Operating Officer of the Employer contemplated in this
Agreement. Executive has read this Agreement, was encouraged and afforded
sufficient opportunity to obtain independent legal advice prior to executing this
company to actually “go public” granting stock options to too many employees.
The Commission asserts that a company with five hundred or more holders of
employee stock options, like a company with five hundred or more holders of
common stock, must register under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. Section
12(g) registration would mean the private company would have essentially the same
reporting burdens as a company that had completed an initial public offering.
Robert Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 119596 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
46 Under Sections 421 and 422 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, if the option terms
comply with established rules for an incentive stock option (e.g., a duration of no more than 10 years
and an option price that is at or out of the money) and the requisite holding period is met, the exercise
of the option does not result in compensation income to the optionee or related compensation
deductions to the corporation granting the option. 26 U.S.C. §§ 421, 422 (2007). The optionee
typically recognizes capital gain upon the sale of the underlying shares. See David I. Walker, Is Equity
Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 702-03 (2004).

The option price typically would be set at the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date
of the grant/issuance of the option to avoid public disclosure conundrums, adverse accounting
effects, and tax issues (especially for incentive stock options, like those issued to Executive here). Cf.
Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1034
(2007) (noting that these issues arise out of options backdating).
47
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Agreement, and fully understands all of the terms and conditions in this
Agreement.48
8.
Definitions.49 For purposes of this Agreement, the terms set forth
below have the meanings specified in this Section 8.
[a]
“Accounts” means all Persons to whom any employee or agent
of the Employer (including Executive) has earlier offered or sold or later offers or
sells any of the Employer’s products or services, or with whom any employee or
agent of the Employer has developed a relationship relating to the Employer
Business at any time during the two-year period preceding the termination or
expiration of Executive’s employment by the Employer.50 For purposes of this
48

See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.

49 Typically, definition sections in business contracts appear at the front or the back of the agreement.
The form chosen by the authors for the Tennessee Model Employment Agreement instead includes
the definition section in the middle of the contract, proximate to the sections in which most of the
defined terms in the Agreement are used. In particular, most of the defined terms in Section 8 relate
to the restrictive covenants in Section 9. Although one of the authors admits to some discomfort
over this placement, the authors determined to leave the definition section in this intermediate
position in the Agreement. See ADAMS, supra note 25, at 123-25 (articulating rules for the crossreferencing of defined terms, placement of definition sections, and other related definitions
questions).
50 This is a relatively broad definition of customers or clients in that it covers both those to whom
offers were made and those with whom the Employer has developed a business relationship, as
opposed to merely those to whom sales were made, over a two-year period. As noted in the
provision, that two-year period may extend to include offers and sales made before the
commencement of Executive’s employment with the Employer. If challenged, the reasonableness of
this definition in the context of the restrictive covenants in which it is used presumably will be
determined based on the facts in existence at the time, including the number of possible customers or
clients not encompassed within the definition. Some states have expressed a willingness to enforce
provisions with a breadth similar to that apparent in this definition.

An employer has a legitimate interest in limiting not only a former employee’s
ability to take advantage of personal relationships the employee has developed
while representing the employer to the employer’s established client, but also in
preventing a former employee from using his former employer’s customer lists or
contacts to solicit new customers. . . . In addition, an employer has a legitimate
interest in preventing a former employee from using the skill, experience, training,
and confidential information the former employee has acquired during the
employee’s tenure with his employer in a manner advantageous to a competitor in
attracting business, regardless of whether it was an already established customer of
the former employer.
UZ Engineered Prods. Co. v. Midwest Motor Supply Co., 770 N.E.2d 1068, 1080 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001) (citations omitted); see also FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (2009) (articulating similar factors as
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Agreement, an Account shall be deemed to be located at the address of the Account
with which the Employer regularly deals.
[b]

“Cause” means any one of the following:51

[i]
Executive commits
embezzlement, or fraud against the Employer;

an

act

of

dishonesty,

[ii]
Executive competes with the Employer in a manner
prohibited by this Agreement;
[iii]
Executive fails to use his best efforts on behalf of the
Employer or conducts himself in a manner substantially detrimental to the Employer
(including without limitation by breaching any of his obligations under this
Agreement and failing or refusing to comply with the provisions of this Agreement
within five days after receipt of written notice from the Employer to Executive
detailing the failure or refusal and the steps necessary to remedy that failure);52

“legitimate business interest[s]” of an employer in the adjudication of the enforceability of a
noncompetition agreement).
Definitions of “cause” are very fact-specific, although core events (e.g., commission of a fraud,
conviction of a felony, and legal incapacity to serve) are common to many agreements. See generally J.
Benjamin Earthman, Illusory Protection: The Treatment of Severance Packages in Business Bankruptcies, 5 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 33, 39 (2002) (“A majority of employment contracts contain a list of
enumerated circumstances that constitute ‘cause’ for terminating an employee. These so-called ‘bad
boy’ clauses-or where they govern the employee’s post-termination activities, ‘golden handcuffs’-vary
from the extremely specific to the overly broad often within each individual contract.”); see also
Michelle M. Matiski, Employment Agreement, Representing the Growing Business: Tax, Corporate, Securities, and
Accounting Issues, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, Feb. 2008 (including a sample definition
of “cause.”). The employer may want to consider whether the definition of “cause” should include
the employer’s reasonable belief that the executive’s conduct constitutes “cause,” even if the employer
ultimately turns out to be wrong. Some jurisdictions support an employer’s good faith belief and
adequate investigation as a sufficient basis for termination, but an employer is more likely to prevail in
asserting a termination right under these circumstances if the employment agreement explicitly
addresses reasonable belief. See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Intern., Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 421-22 (Cal.
1998) (“The proper inquiry for the jury…is not, ‘Did the employee in fact commit the act leading to
dismissal?’ It is ‘Was the factual basis on which the employer concluded a dischargeable act had been
committed reached honestly, after an appropriate investigation and for reasons that that are not
arbitrary or pretextual?’”).
51

52 This is a relatively employer-friendly provision. An executive may want to narrow the type of
activity that constitutes “cause” to the behaviors described in the parentheses or similar, clear
violations of the terms of the executive’s employment or written rules and policies of the employer.
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[iv]
Executive is convicted of a misdemeanor involving
dishonesty, breach of trust or moral turpitude, or is convicted of any felony;
[v]

Executive engages in the illegal use of any drug;

[vi]
Executive’s representation and warranty in Section 7
of this Agreement is determined to be [materially] inaccurate; or
[vii]
any state or federal regulatory agency or court of
competent jurisdiction issues an order requiring Executive’s removal from any duties
or responsibilities for the Employer.
[c]
following events:

A “Change of Control”53 means the occurrence of any of the

[i]
any “person” or “group” (as these terms are used in
Sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the Exchange Act) is or becomes the “beneficial owner”
(as defined in Rule 13d-3 under the Exchange Act), directly or indirectly, of more
than 50% of the voting power of the Common Stock of the Employer;
[ii]
the Employer, either individually or in conjunction
with one or more Subsidiaries, sells, assigns, conveys, transfers, leases or otherwise
disposes of, or the Subsidiaries sell, assign, convey, transfer, lease or otherwise
dispose of, all or substantially all of the properties of the Employer and the
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole (either in one transaction or a series of related
transactions), including capital stock of the Subsidiaries, to any Person (other than
the Company or a Subsidiary);
[iii]
during any consecutive two-year period, individuals
who at the beginning of the period constituted the Board of Directors of the
Employer (together with any new directors whose election by the Board of Directors
or whose nomination for election by the shareholders of the Employer was
approved by a vote of a majority of the directors then still in office who were either
directors at the beginning of the period or whose election or nomination for election

The parties must include in this definition all transactions and events—and only those transactions
and events—that predicate payment of the severance provided for in Section 4[c] of the Agreement.
Accordingly, both the Employer and Executive should focus significant attention on this definition.
See Ocker & Schick, supra note 45, at 48 (“The definition of change of control must be drafted with
care so that enhanced severance benefits are only triggered under the intended circumstances.”).
53
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was previously so approved) cease for any reason to constitute a majority of the
Board of Directors of the Employer then in office; or
[iv]
the Employer is liquidated or dissolved or adopts a
plan of liquidation or dissolution.54
[d]
“Complete Disability” means Executive’s inability, due to illness,
accident, or any other physical or mental incapacity, to perform the duties provided
for in this Agreement for an aggregate of 90 days within any period of 240
consecutive days.
[e]

“Confidential Information”55 means

[i]
names, addresses, telephone numbers, contact
persons, and other identifying information relating to Accounts and information
with respect to the needs and requirements of Accounts;
[ii]
rate and price information on products and services
provided by the Employer to its Accounts;
[iii]
all business records and personnel data relating to the
Employer’s employees, including compensation arrangements of the employees;
This is an employee-friendly provision not routinely included in employment agreement definitions
of a “Change of Control.”
54

Definitions of “Confidential Information” vary, but certain key items are typically included. For
example, one employer’s agreement provides the following similar definition of “Confidential
Information:”
55

All information belonging to or used by Compuware or Compuware’s customers
relating to internal operations, procedures and policies, business strategies, pricing,
billing information, financial information, customer contacts, clients, sales lists,
employee lists, technology, software source code, software documentation,
programs, costs, employee compensation, marketing plans, developmental plans,
computer programs, computer systems, inventions, developments, and trade
secrets of any kind and character.
Scott M. Kline & Matthew C. Floyd, Managing Confidential Relationships in Intellectual Property Transactions:
Use Restrictions, Residual Knowledge Clauses, and Trade Secrets, 25 REV. LITIG. 311, 318 n.17 (2006).
Employers are well advised to carefully tailor the definition to their specific reasonable interests, since
the definition’s application in the restrictive covenants is likely to be judged based on a reasonableness
standard. See Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information under Georgia Law, 19 GA. L.
REV. 623, 668 n.195 (1985) (“In order to avoid overbreadth, an employer should limit the types of
business information claimed to be confidential.”).
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[iv]
any trade secrets56 or other confidential information
licensed to, obtained, developed, purchased, or otherwise possessed by the Employer
or licensed by the Employer to others;
[v]
any [A] other trade secrets or confidential information
used by Executive in the course of his employment under this Agreement or
obtained by Executive in the course of his employment under this Agreement from
any officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Employer or any division,
Subsidiary, or affiliate of the Employer or otherwise, [B] information contained in
any confidential documents prepared by or for the Employer and its employees or
agents at the Employer’s expense, on Employer time, or otherwise in furtherance of
the Employer Business, and [C] other similar information used or obtained by
Executive in the course of his employment with the Employer;
[vi]

financial information with respect to the Employer

Business; and
[vii]
information with respect to the Employer’s suppliers
and the source and availability of the supplies, equipment, and materials used in the
Employer Business;
provided, however, that Confidential Information shall not include:57 [x] any
information that shall become generally known to the industry through no fault of
Executive; [y] any information that shall be disclosed to Executive by a third party
(other than an officer, employer, agent, or representative of the Employer or any
division, Subsidiary, or affiliate of the Employer or Seller58) having legitimate and
56

Under Tennessee law, a “trade secret” is
information, without regard to form, including, but not limited to, technical, nontechnical or
financial data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, process,
or plan that:
(A) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1702(4) (2009) (Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
57

The exclusions set forth in this paragraph are customary.

58 The exclusion would be overbroad without the reference to both Employer and Seller, since
Employer is continuing Seller’s business.
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unrestricted possession of that information and the unrestricted right to make the
disclosure to Executive; or [z] any information that Executive can demonstrate was
within his legitimate and unrestricted possession prior to the time of his employment
by the Employer or Seller. All Confidential Information shall be contractually
subject to protection under this Agreement whether the Confidential Information
would otherwise be regarded or legally considered “confidential” and without regard
to whether the Confidential Information constitutes a trade secret under applicable
law or is separately protectable at law or in equity as a trade secret.
[f]
“Employer Business” has the meaning assigned to it in the
recitals of this Agreement.59
[g]

The “Employer’s Territory” is _________________.60

[h]
“Exchange Act” means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, and the regulations adopted under it.
[i]
“Good Reason” means [i] any decision by the Employer’s
governing board that results in the primary business of the Employer being a
business other than the Employer Business, [ii] any substantial change in the
positions or responsibilities of Executive without the consent of Executive, [iii] any
decision resulting in Executive’s fringe benefits under the employee benefit or health
or welfare plans or programs of the Employer being materially decreased in the
aggregate (excluding reductions due to general benefit plan changes applicable to the
Employer’s employees generally), [iv] any failure by the Employer to pay Executive’s
Base Salary or to provide for Executive’s annual bonus if and when due, [v] any
relocation of Executive’s primary place of employment to a location which is more
This definition is particularly important to the noncompetition agreements and other restrictive
covenants in Section 9. See also supra note 29. It is important to note that noncompetition agreements
in certain businesses may be subject to special rules, including those set forth in statutory provisions.
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1-148 (2008) (governing covenants not to compete signed by
healthcare providers).
59

60 The reasonableness of the geographical scope of the business that the Employer intends to protect
through the restrictive covenants is a litigable issue. Accordingly, the Employer should clearly define
this scope and appropriately tailor this definition to reasonably protect its interests, without
overreaching. See Brian Kingsley Krumm, Covenants Not to Compete: Time for Legislative and Judicial
Reform in Tennessee, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 447, 464 (2005) (“[T]he territorial restriction should only be as
broad as necessary to allow the employer to protect its customers from appropriation by its former
employee. As a practical matter, this should limit the territorial scope to those areas where the
employee had customer contact. This is based on the customer-contact theory of the employer’s
protectable interests.” (footnotes omitted)).
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than 60 miles from the city limits of _____________, Tennessee, if any of the
actions described in the foregoing clauses [i] through [v] are not cured by the
Employer (if capable of cure or remedy) within 15 days after receiving notice from
Executive.
[j]
“Person” means any individual, corporation, limited liability
company, partnership, unincorporated organization, joint venture, association, bank,
trust, governmental authority, or other entity.
[k]
“Subsidiary” has the meaning assigned to it in the Asset
Purchase Agreement.
9.

Covenants Against Post-Termination Conduct.61

[a]
Covenant Against Disclosure or Use of Confidential Information.62
Executive agrees that, for a period of ___ years63 immediately after the termination
or expiration of his employment under this Agreement, he will not:
[i]

disclose any Confidential Information to any Person;

61 The enforceability of the restrictive covenants included in this Section 9 (like all nondisclosure and
noncompetition agreements) may be subject to legal challenge. Should a judge determine that any
part of the covenants is unenforceable,

[t]he “rule of reasonableness,” which was adopted by Tennessee in Ingram, allows
the courts to enforce covenants not to compete to the extent necessary to protect
the employer’s interest without imposing an undue hardship on the employee or
adversely affecting the public. In the absence of bad faith by the employer, this
approach, in theory, allows for partial enforcement of the terms that the parties
intended. This is particularly true when the agreement contains a severability clause
and specifically allows for judicial modification. This rule, however, does not
provide an employee with any prospective guidance on how a particular covenant
not to compete will be enforced absent litigating the issue.
Krumm, supra note 60, at 473.
In Tennessee, courts will enforce reasonable restrictions on the disclosure of confidential
information in employment agreements as a legitimately protectable interest of the employer. See
Vantage Tech., LLC v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“An employer has a
legitimate business interest in keeping its former employees from using the former employer’s trade or
business secrets or other confidential information in competition against the former employer.”).

62

63 “When the focus of protection is confidential information or trade secrets, it should be limited in
time by the business significance of the covenant.” Krumm, supra note 60, at 464.
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[ii]
use any Confidential Information in soliciting the
patronage of any Person for the purpose of providing products or services of the
kind provided in the Employer Business; or
[iii]

otherwise use any Confidential Information for his

own purposes;
provided, however, that Executive may make disclosures required by a valid order or
subpoena issued by a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction. In
that event, Executive will promptly notify the Employer of the order or subpoena to
provide the Employer an opportunity to protect its interest. Executive shall not be
bound by the restrictive covenants in this Section if: the Employer is not current in
meeting its obligations to Executive under Section 4[c]; Executive has notified the
Employer in writing of that default; and the Employer has not cured the default
within 30 days after the date the Executive sends the written notice of default.
[b]
Covenant Against Post-Termination Competition.64 Executive
agrees that, for a period of ___ years65 immediately after the termination or
64 Courts ruling on the enforceability of noncompetition covenants in employment agreements have
variously stated the applicable legal standard, but the focus in each articulation is the reasonableness
of the restrictions imposed in response to legitimate business interests of the employer.

Covenants not to compete, because they are in restraint of trade, are disfavored in
Tennessee. As such, they are construed strictly in favor of the employee.
However, when the restrictions are reasonable under the circumstances, such
covenants are enforceable. The factors that are relevant in determining whether a
covenant not to compete is reasonable include “the consideration supporting the
agreements; the threatened danger to the employer in the absence of such an
agreement; the economic hardship imposed on the employee by such a covenant;
and whether or not such a covenant should be inimical to public interest.”
Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 644 (citations omitted).
It is the general rule in Tennessee that a covenant restraining future competition is
valid if it is reasonable as to time and space. “* * * There is no inflexible formula
for deciding the ubiquitous question of reasonableness, insofar as noncompetitive
covenants are concerned * * * [rather,] * * * each case must stand or fall on its own
facts. * * *” “* * * It is generally agreed that, before a noncompetitive covenant
will be upheld as reasonable and therefore enforceable, the time and territorial
limits involved must be no greater than is necessary to protect the business
interests of the employer. * * *” In making such determination the Court may
consider such factors as the consideration supporting it, the threatened danger to
the employer in the absence of such an agreement, the economic hardship imposed
on the employee, and the public interest.
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expiration of his employment under this Agreement, he will not, directly or
indirectly, individually or on behalf of any Person:
[i]
solicit any Account for the purpose of selling or
providing to the Account products or services of the same kind as provided by the
Employer during Executive’s employment by the Employer;66 or
[ii]
provide services of the type provided by Executive to
the Employer to any Person then engaged in the Employer Business within the
Employer’s Territory; or
[iii]
enter into the employ of, render any service to, or act
in concert with any Person engaged in the Employer Business within the Employer’s
Territory;

Standard Forms Co. v. Nave, 422 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (citations omitted).
Tennessee will not enforce a noncompetition agreement merely to prevent an employee from
competing with an employer.
[A]ny competition by a former employee may well injure the business of the
employer. An employer, however, cannot by contract restrain ordinary
competition. In order for an employer to be entitled to protection, there must be
special facts present over and above ordinary competition. These special facts
must be such that without the covenant not to compete the employee would gain
an unfair advantage in future competition with the employer.
Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1984) (citations omitted). As noted supra
note 61, Tennessee uses the “rule of reasonableness” in modifying unenforceable covenants not to
compete. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984) (“The most
recent trend, therefore, has been to abandon the ‘blue pencil’ rule in favor of a rule of reasonableness.
This rule provides that unless the circumstances indicate bad faith on the part of the employer, a court
will enforce covenants not to compete to the extent that they are reasonably necessary to protect the
employer’s interest ‘without imposing undue hardship on the employee when the public interest is not
adversely affected.’” (citations omitted)). For practical tips on drafting noncompetition agreements
and clauses, see RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 127-33 (2007);
.Mark Rettinger, Covenants Not To Compete in Tennessee, 3 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 25 (2001).
Krumm, supra note 60, at 464 (“Where the objective is to protect customer relationships, the period
should be limited to that required to replace the employee and allow the employers to prove their
effectiveness to their customers. . . . In deciding the reasonableness of the duration of the restriction,
courts will also determine the length of time necessary to diminish the risk of harm from competition
to the former employer.” (footnotes omitted)).
65

66 This provision expressly protects the Employer’s customer associations. Under Tennessee law,
“[a]n employer may also have a legitimate protectable interest in the relationships between its
employees and its customers.” Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 645.
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[iv]
become interested in a firm engaged in the Employer
Business, as a proprietor, partner, shareholder, director, officer, principal, agent,
employee, or consultant or in any other relationship or capacity; provided, that
Executive may own up to one percent of the outstanding shares of any firm that has
a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act;67 or
[v]
induce or attempt to induce any employee of the
Employer or its affiliates to leave that employment or employ, or otherwise engage
as an employee, independent contractor, or otherwise, any employee of the
Employer or its affiliates.
[c]
Enforceability of Section 9 Covenants. It is agreed that a special
and confidential relationship exists between the Employer and Executive because of
Executive’s knowledge, expertise, and judgment and the reliance of the Employer
upon these attributes. The Executive agrees that the remedy at law for the breach or
the threatened breach of the covenants set forth in this Section 9 is inadequate and
that any breach or attempted breach of these covenants would cause immediate and
irreparable harm to the Employer, the exact amount of which would be impossible
to ascertain. Executive acknowledges that the limitations contained in this Section 9
are reasonable and properly required for the adequate protection of the Employer,
and in the event that any one or more of the limitations are found to be invalid in
any jurisdiction, in whole or in part, the parties agree that such limitations will be
held valid in all other jurisdictions. If any court determines that any provision of this
Section 9 is unenforceable because of the duration or scope of the provision, the
court shall have the power to reduce the scope or duration of the provision, as the
case may be, and, in its reduced form, the provision shall remain in full force and
effect. 68

The ownership of an insignificant percentage (typically one or two percent) of a firm’s publicly
traded securities is not considered to be enough of an ownership interest to constitute competition
with a former employer.

67

This sentence may be seen by some as an unwarranted assertion of the Employer’s bargaining
power in light of its negotiation to the outer limits of enforceability and may be repugnant to
Executive and his counsel. The authors have included this language here because they believe the
sentence is somewhat less problematic for an executive under Tennessee law, which does not allow
“blue penciling” but instead relies on the “rule of reasonableness” for judicial modifications of
covenants not to compete. See supra notes 61 & 64.
68
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Inventions, Discoveries and Improvements.69

[a]
Disclosure to Employer. Executive shall promptly disclose in
writing to the Employer any and all inventions, discoveries, and improvements,
directly or indirectly related to the Employer Business, whether conceived, made, or
developed solely by Executive or jointly with others during the period of Executive’s
employment under this Agreement.70 All of Executive’s right, title, and interest in
and to inventions, discoveries, and improvements referenced in the preceding
sentence that are conceived, made, or developed by Executive during the period of
his employment under this Agreement shall be the sole property of the Employer.
[b]
Documents of Assignment.71 At the Employer’s request and
expense, both during and subsequent to Executive’s employment under this
In Tennessee, the enforceability of the inventions clauses in this Section 10 is a matter of common
law. However, in California, Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Washington, for example,
statutory provisions are applicable. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2870, 2871 (2008); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT.
1060/2 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 181.78 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-57.1 (2008); WASH REV. CODE
§ 49.44.140 (2008).
69

This provision assumes that Executive has already disclosed to the Employer, in connection with
the negotiation and execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement, any and all inventions, discoveries,
and improvements, directly or indirectly related to the Seller’s business, whether conceived, made, or
developed solely by Executive or jointly with others during the period of Executive’s employment
with the Seller and that any desired restrictions on those inventions, discoveries, and improvements
are handled elsewhere.
70

“Employment agreements requiring an employee to assign to the employer rights to inventions
designed or conceived during the period of employment have been upheld. . . . The determining
factor of whether assignment-of-rights-agreements are enforceable seems to be one of
reasonableness.” Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751, 761-62 (Iowa 1999); see
also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 886, (N.J. 1988) (“[C]ontracts requiring an employee
to assign to the employer inventions designed or conceived during the period of employment are
valid.”). An obligation on the part of Executive to assign inventions, discoveries and improvements
to the Employer may be implied under certain circumstances where an express covenant does not
exist. The Colorado Court of Appeals summarizes:
71

If an employee’s job duties include the responsibility for inventing or for solving a
particular problem that requires invention, any invention created by that employee
during the performance of those responsibilities belongs to the employer. Hence,
such an employee is bound to assign to the employer all rights to the invention.
This is so because, under these circumstances, the employee has produced only that
which he was employed to produce, and the courts will find an implied contract
obligation to assign any rights to the employer.
Scott Sys., Inc. v. Scott, 996 P.2d 775, 778 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted); see also City of
Cocoa v. Leffler, 762 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“When an employer undertakes to
establish a claim to a patent or a patentable object as against his employee who is the inventor, he must
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Agreement, Executive shall promptly execute a specific assignment of title to the
Employer of each invention, discovery, or improvement belonging to the Employer
and shall perform all other acts reasonably necessary to enable the Employer to
secure a patent for the invention, discovery, or improvement in the United States
and in foreign countries and to maintain, defend, and assert the patent once it has
been obtained.
[c]
Prior Inventions.
Any inventions, discoveries, or
improvements, patented or unlamented, that Executive can demonstrate were
conceived or made by him prior to the date of this Agreement shall be excluded
from the provisions of this Section.
11.
Return of Client Lists, Other Documents and Equipment.
Upon the termination or expiration of his employment under this Agreement,
Executive shall deliver promptly to the Employer all Employer files, customer lists,
memoranda, research, drawings, blueprints, Employer forms, and other documents
supplied to or created by him in connection with his employment under this
Agreement (including all copies of the foregoing) in his possession or control and all
Employer equipment and other materials in his possession or control. Executive
acknowledges that all items described in this Section 11 are and will remain at all
times the sole and exclusive property of the Employer.
12.
Survival of Restrictions and Other Provisions. Notwithstanding
the breach of any of the provisions of this Agreement by either party, all of the
provisions of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, and 23 of this
Agreement72 shall survive the termination or expiration of Executive’s employment
with the Employer for any reason and shall continue in full force and effect in the
same manner and to the same extent as if they were set forth in a separate agreement
between the Employer and Executive, and these provisions shall be binding on the
heirs, legatees, and legal representative(s) of Executive.

show beyond question that the employment was for that specific purpose of making the invention. If the employment
was general and was an incident to that, the employer cannot claim the patent.”). However, the
general rule is that inventions are owned by the inventor. See id. at 1055 (“The common law generally
regards an invention as the property of the inventor who conceived, developed, and perfected it.
Thus, the general rule is that employees own the patent rights to their inventions, even though the
inventions are conceived or reduced to practice during employment.” (citations omitted)).
72 It is always important to remember to provide for the survival of the section in which survival is
provided for.
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13.
Hold Harmless.73 Executive and the Employer covenant and agree
that each shall indemnify and hold harmless the other from [a] any and all losses,
damages, liabilities, expenses, or claims resulting from or arising out of any
nonfulfillment by the defaulting party of any material provision of this Agreement
and [b] any and all losses, damages, liabilities, expenses, or claims resulting from or
arising out of the defaulting party’s malfeasance or gross negligence. The
indemnification provided for in this Section 13 shall not apply to losses, damages,
liabilities, expenses, or claims suffered or asserted by the Employer against Executive
or losses, damages, liabilities, expenses, or claims suffered or asserted by Executive
against the Employer.
14.
Contract Nonassignable.74 The parties acknowledge that this
Agreement has been entered into due to, among other things, the special skills of
Executive, and agree that this Agreement may not be assigned or transferred by
Executive, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of the Employer.
This Agreement shall be binding on and shall inure to the benefit of Executive, the
Employer, and their respective successors and assigns.
15.
Notices.75 All notices or other communications required or
permitted under this Agreement shall be in writing and may be given or made by
hand, by facsimile transmission, by registered or certified mail, postage pre-paid, or
by courier or overnight carrier, to the persons at the addresses set forth below (or at
another address provided under this Agreement) and shall be deemed to have been
delivered as of the date of delivery in the case of delivery by hand or facsimile
This Section 13 includes a bare-bones indemnification provision covering losses, damages,
liabilities, expenses, or claims resulting from or arising out of any nonfulfillment by the defaulting
party of any material provision of this Agreement and losses or damages arising from the defaulting
party’s malfeasance or gross negligence. This type of indemnification is possible, if allowed under
state corporate law. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-507 (2008).

73

74 Typically, “[t]he employer should reserve the right to assign the employment agreement so that a
successor employer may benefit from the employee’s services in the event of a merger, consolidation,
asset purchase or other business transaction. The employment agreement should not be assignable by
the employee, however, because the employee’s unique ability to do the job is not transferable.” See
Peter M. Panken & Jeffery D. Williams, Drafting Executive Employment Agreements that Work for Employers:
An Annotated Model Contract, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, 3 ADV. EMP. L. & LITIG.
(2000). “[S]ome jurisdictions view the covenant not to compete as independently assignable
regardless of the assignability of the employment contract.” Adam Schneid, Note, Assignability of
Covenants Not to Compete: When Can a Successor Firm Enforce a Noncompete Agreement?, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1485, 1497 (2006); see also Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. Tart, 955 F. Supp. 547, 556-58 (W.D.N.C.
1997).
75

For more information on notice provisions, see DARMSTADTER, supra note 24, at 109-13.
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(provided confirmation of delivery is obtained), on the next business day if sent by
overnight courier or mail service, or the third business day following mail deposit in
the case of regular mail delivery:
To the Employer:
[insert full name and address of the Employer, including both P.O.
box and street address (if applicable), telephone number, and
facsimile number; then insert the same information for the
Employer’s counsel, if desired]
To Executive:
[insert full name and address of Executive, including both P.O. box
and street address (if applicable), telephone number, and facsimile
number; then insert the same information for Executive’s counsel, if
desired]
16.
Cumulative and Severable Nature of Rights and Agreements.
Executive acknowledges and agrees that the Employer’s various rights and remedies
in this Agreement are cumulative and nonexclusive of one another and that
Executive’s several undertakings and agreements contained in this Agreement,
including those contained in Sections 9, 10, and 11 of this Agreement, are severable
covenants independent of one another and of any other provision or covenant of
this Agreement. Executive agrees that the existence of any claim by him against the
Employer, whether predicated on this Agreement or otherwise, shall not constitute a
defense to enforcement by the Employer of any or all of Executive’s undertakings
and agreements under this Agreement. If any provision or covenant of this
Agreement, in its entirety or in part, should be held by any court to be invalid, illegal
or unenforceable, the remaining provisions, covenants, or parts of provisions or
covenants, shall remain in full force and effect.76
17.
Waiver. Failure of either party to insist, in one or more instances, on
performance by the other in strict accordance with any term or condition of this
Agreement shall not be deemed a waiver or relinquishment of any right granted in
this Agreement or of the future performance by either party of its obligations under

76 See supra notes 61 and 64 for a description of Tennessee’s “rule of reasonableness” in enforcing
partial noncompetition provisions.
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the same or any other term or condition of this Agreement, unless the waiver is
contained in a writing signed by the party making the waiver.
18.
Amendments and Modifications. This Agreement may be
amended or modified only by a writing signed by both parties to this Agreement.
19.
Execution in Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in
two or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of
which shall constitute one and the same instrument.
20.
Headings.
The headings used in this Agreement are for
convenience of reference and shall not be deemed a part of this Agreement and shall
not affect the meaning or construction of any of the provisions in this Agreement.
21.
Entire Agreement. This Agreement (including the documents
referred to in this Agreement) constitutes the entire agreement among the parties
and supersedes any prior understandings, agreements, or representations by or
among the parties, written or oral, to the extent they related in any way to the subject
matter of this Agreement.
22.
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the domestic laws of the State of Tennessee without
giving effect to any choice or conflict of law provision or rule (whether of the State
of Tennessee or any other jurisdiction) that would cause the application of the laws
of any jurisdiction other than the State of Tennessee.77

A court’s application of public policy and state interest may override even an abundantly clear
choice of law provision. See, e.g., Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 238 S.E.2d 368, 369 (Ga. 1977) (“Although
the plaintiff and the defendant had agreed that the contract would be construed pursuant to the law of
Tennessee, the trial court applied the law of Georgia. We find no error. The law of the jurisdiction
chosen by parties to a contract to govern their contractual rights will not be applied by Georgia courts
where application of the chosen law would contravene the policy of, or would be prejudicial to the
interests of, this state.”).
77
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23. Dispute Resolution.78
[a]
In the event any claim, dispute, or controversy arises in
connection with this Agreement or the interpretation or enforcement of any
provision of this Agreement and the claim, dispute, or controversy is not resolved
within 30 days through informal, good faith negotiations between the parties, the
claim, dispute, or controversy shall be referred to non-binding mediation. It is
agreed that any mediation shall be conducted in [insert name of city], Tennessee (or
some other location upon mutual consent of the parties involved) at a time and place
convenient to the mediator and the parties involved. The parties shall, in good faith,
select a mediator who is mutually agreeable to both sides. Each party shall bear his
or its own costs and attorneys’ fees associated with the mediation and shall share
equally the responsibility for paying the mediator’s fee.
[b]
Should any claim, dispute, or controversy remain in existence
between the parties after the completion of the two-step resolution process set forth
in Section 23[a] above, the parties shall promptly submit the claim, dispute, or
controversy to arbitration79 administered by one arbitrator mutually agreeable to the
This is a very simple form of dispute resolution provision. Employment agreements often include
an agreement to use alternative dispute resolution to settle some or all issues arising between the
parties under the agreement. Many of these contractual alternative dispute resolution provisions take
advantage of the opportunity to define the scope of those issues and procedural aspects of the dispute
resolution process.
78

For decades, attorneys have encouraged their clients to incorporate language
providing for arbitration and mediation into contractual agreements, including joint
venture, purchase or sales agreements, licensing agreements, executive employment
contracts, partnerships, franchise, and loan agreements. Through contractual
provisions, parties designing [ ] ADR clauses may control the range of issues to be
resolved, the scope of the relief to be awarded, the qualifications of the neutral and
many of the procedural aspects of the process.
William K. Slate II, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Global Village, THE METROPOLITAN CORP.
COUNSEL, Aug. 1996, at 44. As an alternative, the parties could provide for a choice of venue for a
legal action. It is important to include in the agreement an alternative dispute resolution mechanism
or a choice of venue provision, as well as a choice of law provision, because the enforceability of the
restrictive covenants may differ from state to state. See supra note 15. Without one provision or the
other, the parties will be encouraged to forum-shop, and enforcement is uncertain. Palmer & Cay,
Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 404 F.3d 1297, 1310 (11th Cir. 2005) (validating the application of
Georgia law to the enforceability of an employment agreement that did not include a choice of law or
choice of venue provision and ruling that the related declaratory relief is not limited to Georgia); see
also DLA Piper, Another Hurdle to Enforcing Restrictive Covenants, NEWS & INSIGHTS, Nov. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.dlapiper.com/restrictive_covenant_nov05/ (noting the potential for forumshopping created by the ruling in Palmer & Cay). Although the parties may be tempted to rely on a
broadly drafted arbitration clause in the Asset Purchase Agreement, the intent to subject disputes
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parties in accordance with the rules and procedures of the American Arbitration
Association. It is agreed that any arbitration shall be conducted in [insert name of
city], Tennessee (or some other location upon mutual consent of the parties
involved) at a time and place convenient to the arbitrator and the parties. The
arbitrator shall have the power to decree any and all relief of an equitable nature,
including but not limited to specific performance and shall have the power to award
damages, except punitive damages.80 The arbitrator [shall determine how all
expenses relating to the arbitration shall be paid, including the respective expenses of
each party, the fees of the arbitrator, and the administrative fee of the American
Arbitration Association] [shall make an appropriate monetary award to the prevailing
party so that all expenses relating to the arbitration, including the respective expenses
of the prevailing party, the fees of the arbitrator, and the administrative fee of the
American Arbitration Association shall be paid by the non-prevailing party].81 The
under the Agreement to arbitration is more clear if it is set forth expressly in the Agreement. See
Frounfelker v. Identity Group, Inc., No. M2001-02542-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 390, at
*9-*11 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 5, 2002) (declining to apply an arbitration provision in an acquisition
agreement to a claim under an ancillary employment agreement because the parties’ intent to arbitrate
was not clear); Patrick V. Fiel, Jr., Case Commentary, Employment agreement providing judicial remedies for
dispute supercedes asset purchase agreement’s arbitration clause, 4 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 283, 28384 (2003) (commenting on Frounfelker).
79 Employment arbitration may be faster and less expensive than litigation and may give the employee
greater “access to dispute resolution forum.” BALES ET AL., supra note 64, at 33-34. However,
employment arbitration also has disadvantages, especially where the drafting is done by, and the
bargaining power is weighted in favor of, the employer. Id. at 34.
80 The authors determined not to afford the arbitrator the power to award punitive damages. The
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act allows for arbitral awards of punitive damages, but provides that
“[i]f an arbitrator awards punitive damages or other exemplary relief . . . , the arbitrator shall specify in
the award the basis in fact justifying and the basis in law authorizing the award and state separately the
amount of the punitive damages or other exemplary relief.” UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(e) (2000).

Two alternatives are offered here for delineating the power of the arbitrator to allocate expenses
between the parties or award expenses to a party. A third possibility is for the Agreement to provide
that the Employer pays all arbitral expenses. See Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution
Clauses in High Stakes Employment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 130 (2002)
(“Numerous CEO contracts permit the arbitrator to award the payment of attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party. In contrast, many CEO contracts call for all costs and fees of arbitration to be borne
by the employer company.”). In this regard, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act provides:
81

(b) An arbitrator may award reasonable attorney’s fees and other reasonable
expenses of arbitration if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action
involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to the arbitration
proceeding.
...
(d) An arbitrator’s expenses and fees, together with other expenses, must be paid as
provided in the award.
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arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding and may be entered and judicially
enforced by any court having jurisdiction over the parties.
[c]
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties shall have the right to
resolve by court action, rather than negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, any claim,
dispute, or controversy involving the ownership, misappropriation, or infringement
of intellectual property, intellectual property rights, or Executive’s breach of any
restrictive covenant in this Agreement (including those in Section 9). Nothing in this
Agreement is intended to prevent the parties from obtaining injunctive relief in court
to prevent irreparable harm pending the conclusion of any claim, dispute, or
controversy under this Agreement.82
The parties have executed this Agreement, and by their execution of this Agreement,
the parties represent to one another that they have read this Agreement, understand
its terms and conditions, and intend to be bound by them.
EMPLOYER:

By:
Name:
Title:
EXECUTIVE:
By:
Name:
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21 (2000). The authors were attentive to balance in drafting the
arbitration provision of the Agreement in an effort to enhance enforceability. See BALES ET AL., supra
note 64, at 31 (“Courts generally have agreed that egregiously lopsided agreements should not be
enforced, but often disagree on whether a given arbitration agreement is fair or not.”). In choosing a
provision on the arbitrator’s power to allocate expenses, drafters should consider the effect of the
expense provision on the overall balance of the arbitration provision. For a brief history and
commentary on employment arbitration, see id. at 28-33.
82 Without this language, either party may claim that a temporary restraining order or injunction is not
available for, e.g., actions relating to post-employment competition.

